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Harold Bloom
between
Tradition and Innovation

Aldo Tagliaferri

Tradition and innovation are necessarily related owing to the
fact that symbolic language, which traces the separation between
signifier and signified, produces the image of a before and an after
of itself. Straddling the signifier, the "signified" is in fact split up
into a "before" and an "after" which are both equally fictive and
necessary to the working of language. The implications of this
condition are that the signifier, constitutive of language and therefore of culture, points toward two possible dimensions of the
signified: a signified that has never been transformed into a meaningful entity, which makes it therefore an impossibility; and a
signified ever in need of signification, and pointing therefore to a
subsequent signifier. If the signifier expresses this double reference [rinvio] to absence-on the one hand the inexpressible and on
This essay appeared originally in La Cultura, Documenti de! Primo Congresso
de! Movimento Freudiano Internazionale, Roma, 28-30 January, 1982. Published
by Spirali Edizioni, Milano, 1982.

[Translatedfrom the Italian by Peter Carravetta]
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the other the perennially deferred expression-then
the relationship between tradition and innovation is essential to culture insofar as the latter becomes aware of its intrinsically linguistic nature
and therefore of the dialectics of presence and absence at work in
every cultural act.
Culture is thus most alive when tradition, also, much like
innovation, becomes instrumental in making absence partake in
the signifier. But we are here talking of one kind of absence only,
which is at any rate the absence of what is not yet and which from
the beginning has never been. On the other hand, the projecting in
the historical past of the illusory coincidence of signified and
signifier-which sets Tradition up as an hypostasis of an absolute
presence-is what prevents language from elaborating the lack of
this coincidence. This projecting, in other words, prevents language from pursuing within the horizon of innovation-of
this
alternate face or name for absence-the goal of tracking down that
same first face . If what is present cannot substitute "what is not
yet" for "what is no more," culture cannot exist, for it would fail to
reproduce the dialectical structure of language upon which it is
founded.
Perhaps the earliest functional application of this process is to
be found in religious thought. The Hebrew eternal deferment of
divine manifestation, the eternal awaiting for the Messiah as the
coincidence of signified and signifier that can happen only in the
future-which,
by the way, reproposes the timeliness of an evaluation of the relation between the Freud-Lacan conception of language and Hebraism 1 -can be seen as a useful model to illustrate
this aspect of the innovation/tradition relationship as constitutive
of the grounding cultural choice at the base of modern Western art.
Now this is precisely what Harold Bloom attempts in his
excellent book Kabbalahand Criticism.2 Working around the partially rejected idea that language is God, Bloom traces a series of
illuminating parallels between the Kabbalistic world of perennial
interpretive innovation of the Scripture, and the world of the critic,
the constant and conscious swerve with respect to the tradition
that dwells in our culture, especially as represented by its most
noble artistic exemplars.
Of course, there have been studies that clarified for us how
this strand of the Jewish mystical speculation has survived even
outside the theological horizon. David Bakan, just to cite one such
study, approached Freud as a secular follower of Sabbatian messianism. 3 In pursuing this type of secularization, Bloom's essay
translates in specifically linguistic or poetic terms the Kabbalistic
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theory of the sefirot, or of divine emanation. In fact, in much the
same way in which the sefirot, in emanating from God's infinite
center, institute "modalities of language that replace God," or
strings of tropes among which no causal relation is given; so poetic
texts, relational events par excellence,constantly set up exchanges
with other poetic texts to which they are not, however, linked by
any causal nexus . And much like the trope of divine self-limitation
which distances, according to Lauria, God from men-but in a way
that permits men to draw nearer to Him-; so "each new strong
poet begins with a renewed limit that teaches him, as a poet, his
own proper name, making him repudiate and annul as intolerable
presence the idea of the precursor." What is defined as strong
poetry imposes itself, according to Bloom, thanks to a strong misreading. The strong poet is fully aware of the fact that, whereas
Tradition is an optical effect, the misreading is a working necessity.
To each poet his "own" precursor is a demiurge that needs be
misread, but this, according to Bloom, is in reality "the relationship
at work between each text and any reader whatever." Thus, much
like the Kabbalist, poets know the past only as their own creation.
Now to this analogy between the relationships that exist
among the sefirot, and those that exist among tradition, misreading, swerve and the production of the new sefirot-poetry,we must
bring to bear, as was pointed out at the beginning, the analogy with
the drama of language. The signifier is a misreading of the signified, but the only possibility of bringing the signifier close to the
signified must go through the indeterminate misreading of the
signifier itself. Only by starting from this awareness is it possible to
deploy betrayal, taking advantage of both the strengths and the
weaknesses of the symbolic in order to trace back the substitutions
by means of the substitutions themselves. This instrumental deployment of substitutions, this overcoming of substitutions by
means of substitution itself, is the artifice of artistic restitution
itself.
In terms of linguistic theory, tradition, defined by Bloom as
aggression of the precursor, is the domain of the signifier, the
gratuitousness of symbolic substitutions. In psychoanalytic terms,
it belongs to that complex of admiration and dislike, emulation and
rivalry, eternalizing and killing, that goes by the name of Oedipus
complex.
In the precursor, in the strong poet who typically begins a
tradition, there is thus an overlapping of the oedipal as unrelated
symbolic signifier-which
spurs an indeterminate redeeming by
means of a string of metaphoric deferrals-and
the oedipal as a
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father image and as a reaction against this image In the cultural act
as repetition of the drama of language, what is of utmost
importance is that the oedipal bears upon itself the coincidence
between the opacity of the removal and the swerve of symbolic
language with respect to reality
To go back to the thematic of the Kabbalah, God's first name,
like the name of the father, is substituted for the unsayable
nothingness of Narcissus, and it is then indeterminately forced by
art to give back, by means of the word, silence, meaning, the
unsayable "taken."
Put differently, what Bloom defines as the dialectic of tradition
and innovation can be read as the dialectic between Narcissus and
Oedipus. Self-preservation m Narcissus occurs by means of de
fense mechanisms that need Oedipus, even though at the same
time they fight him off Likewise, the same mechanism can be seen
at work in the new poet who in order to stake his claim needs
precursors but must also fight them. The counter-action of the
effect upon the cause of which Bloom speaks can best be under
stood if interpreted in terms of this dialectic between the highest
instances of the psyche: Narcissus is in fact an effect of the oedipal
complex insofar as he becomes Narcissus II (secondary narcis
sism), but he is at the same time the cause insofar as he is Narcissus
I (primary narcissism) We are still talking about the "signified/'
the illustrious absentee, straddling the signifier by virtue of the
imaginary
The "belated" literary Narcissus II depends upon, according
to Bloom, ''the invention of language,'' the primary oedipal show
ing of God Now God is invested with the responsibility for origi
nal distancing from meaning, the anxiety of representation, the
fault of substitutive arbitrariness. Yet its counter-action upon
language-which manifests itself with explicit force in Beckett's
The Unnameable 4-can be fully grasped only as an attempt to re
cover absolute meaning ( =nothingnesst that is, Narcissus t or
God lost in the word.
The effect that recoils upon the cause is the end that corrects its
own means, the Narcissus attempting to come to grips with itself
and to heal the wound while straddling the Oedipus. This is the
true motor of art, and probably of the whole culture of "belated
ness/' the entire culture of criticism within which we live.
If the dialectic relationship between innovation (difference)
and tradition (identity) within the very same innovative poetic act
entails the copresence of repetition (mimesis, imitation) and
swerve (misreading, critical reading), it is because Narcissus trans
forms itself into Oedipus to thus preserve itself· silence becomes
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word so that it can give itself back in restitution. And since the
means for this travesty is itself a swerve, a misreading, a betrayal,
the new poet places himself-with regard to the preceding poetin the same relationship in which language places itself with regard
to the unsayable: it must betray it in order to conserve it.
Creative innovation is then a swerve upon a swerve, a misreading of a misreading, the betrayal of a betrayal. And tradition is
the preceding betrayal in need of the ongoing betrayal so that it
may continue the indeterminate process of redeeming the unsayable. We can say therefore that our culture has taken the form of
Freud's interminable analysis.
The precursor, bearer of his father's image, does not stand at
the beginning, at the origin, but rather at a midway point. On this
and that side of this midpoinl where we find Oedipus, we have the
two princes of the narcissistic dynasty, Narcissus I and Narcissus
II. Within the adventure of the Jewish people, the Kabbalistic
interpretation
of Scripture-the
culture of belatednessconstitutes a recovery of the Narcissus after the oedipal alienation
and therefore coincides with what most closely characterizes artistic language: both bend substitutive language (which is oedipalsymbolic) in order to produce an instrument which brings back the
Hegelian "living" that this same language has "removed," that
"living" which the Hebrew Kabbalists conceived as the high point
of existence and nothingness at the same time. In psychoanalytic
terms this high point of existence and nothingness, this ineffable
absolute that bears in its bosom its own weakness, is precisely
Narcissus I. The slyness of the ayin (of nothingness) to survive its
own impotence is language in which something is substituted for
the unsayable. The series of the sefirot corresponds to the chain of
signifiers each of which attempts to redeem the preceding one
while at the same time it attempts to catch up on its own falling
away, exactly as we see in the series of Beckett's characters. The
variety of the sefirotis after all rigorously interpreted by the author
of Malone Dies: "les formes sont variees ou l'immuable se soulage
d'etre sans forme" [the forms are many in which the unchanging
seeks relief from its formlessness].
Purposely plain yet such that they can be spontaneously cited,
Beckett's utterances raise immediately the problem of locating
those traits that turn the sefirot into an artwork. In this way the
sefirotis able to produce a new form of the unchanging necessary to
that shifting of signifiers we call our culture. To this end, we may
notice how the relationship between tradition and innovation contained in language is found again within the artwork but only to the
extent in which it is a conscious cultural artwork, that is, insofar as
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it is a "critical" work, a work on language. Thus if we recall for a
moment what was said before concerning the split effect of meaning into an imaginary "before" and an imaginary "after" with
respect to the signifier, it will be useful at this point to suppose the
following: each artistic text is such insofar as it is able to evoke
two other texts, or subtexts, complementary to it. Of these,
the first is deceivingly associated with the "betrayed" signified and
would include the "not yet said"; the second subtext, again deceivingly associated with the signified to be "freed," would include
"what must be said." The artist's task, then, much like that of the
critic, is to ensure that the subtext which precedes the text coincides with the one that follows it, in other words, that Narcissus I
be identical with Narcissus II, and that the unsayable be finally said
by the new signifier. A truly impossible task, and the true task of
our culture.
If we can in fact acknowledge in the artwork the rebounding
effect of the signifier on to something other than itself, and therefore to an unreachable signified, we can also acknowledge in the
latter a nonexisting model that is located simultaneously in a time
"before" the work-contents
betrayed by form-and
in a time
"after" the work-which
translates into the necessity of comprehending it by means of an endless reading, that is, through
criticism, or with a subsequent artwork, that is, through
If in each artwork there's both a Narcissus and an
innovation-.
Oedipus, and if each artistic text hints at another unexpressed,
unexpressable text, then the tension between tradition and innovation is already contained within the artwork as such. The tension is
there originarily insofar as it is a repetition of, and an interminable
remedy for, the oppositional fracture between signifier and signified that's intrinsic to the language within which it comes to be
and which moreover it deploys and attempts to redeem. Tradition
is then the set of signifiers that constitutes the preceding failure
and to which reference must be made in order to be different.
Innovation, on the other hand, is the resumption of the attempt to
conjoin, even if through symbolic language, the signifier with the
signified. But at this point we must ask ourselves whether innovation does not really overtake tradition in a forward movement to a
greater degree than it does in a backward movement, because
already in the mythic origin of language there is the innate image of
a signifier left unsaid, an indelible image since meaning cannot be
expressed. This phantasm, this absence, turns out to be the model
deployed by innovation, whereas tradition hypostasizes the expressed signifiers. Tradition is made up of texts with which to
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model subsequent texts, but what compels text number 2 to differ
from text 1-so as to be different-is still that unexpressable subtext that fed, together with the one actually expressed, the tension
in text number 1. Thus what is at the base of the mechanism that
relates tradition to innovation, the innovative opposition (one
thinks here of Pound's "make it new"), is the resumption of the
project to recove r the signifier carried out by means of a selection,
or swerve, of new signifiers, on the basis of the discarding of old
signifiers with respect to the signified . All of which leads one to
consider the preceding inadequacy, worked out on the basis of an
unknown, to be actually supplying the indispensable pointers for
the necessary subsequent attempt, in other words, that the inadequacy of the text of any given work is nevertheless the necessary instrument to indicate in any determinate manner the absence
of the unsayable. And this is precisely what constitutes the ambivalent lure of tradition.
The unfaithfulness of the student toward his teacher does
nothing more than to repeat the unfaithfulness of the word with
respect to the thing, the very murdering of the thing by the word.
But it is all, of course, a ritualistic repetition, an attempt to expiate a
guilt through sacrifice. The new is repetition and expiation for the
killing of the Father. The fundamental paradox in the tradition/
innovation relation is therefore the following: that the new, or the
absence that has the value of the signified and the function of the
renewal, resides in the bosom of the old but not because it has
already been obtained, overtaken, or forgotten, but because it is
instead never overcome, because it is new from the start, and new
once again becau se unattainable. Thus the way forward and the
way backward coincide . We are of course referring to the Narcissus
of the artwork, the interdicted meaning [significatosbarrato, lit.
barred meaning].
Must we then infer that there is no artistic evolution?"Quite the
contrary; artistic evolution is necessary, and this constitutes its
strength as well as its weakness. The existence of an evolutionary
process conceived as an endless shifting [slittamento]of signifiers is
exactly what we have been talking about. This artistic evolution is
intrinsically marked by the condition of a progressive drawing near
which is at the same time a progressive moving away. This is to be
understood literally, but not in the sense that the two movements
compensate each other by producing a closure of the horizon, but
rather in the sen se that they render the experience more compelling.
As error, Tradition is born when the text (the Canon, Scrip-
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ture) is no longer considered a more or less glorious failure of the
project to represent the unrepresentable. Rather, Tradition is born
when it is considered an imitable but not repeatable realization of
the perfect conjunction of signifier and signified. This dislocation
of the phantasm of the unsayable upon what has already been said
once and for all is the movement of the oedipal opacity that allows
the father to win. Whether we are talking about the Church,
School, Tradition, or bygone Cultures, it is the substitutive word of
truth that confines to the historical past all possibility to innovate.
What is worthy of mention, at any rate, is that in the dialectic
interaction of tradition and innovation, past and future seem to be
interchangeable. Bloom points this out quite appropriately when
he says that thesefirot do not constitute a progressive moving away
from God any more than they constitute a progressive drawing
near Him.
Innovation evokes the signified as if it had been betrayed or
forgotten. Tradition evokes the signifier as if it were still attuned to
the times. Innovation works within the ambivalence of the past
participle; tradition works instead within the ambivalence of the
present participle. In fact, the past participle-"signified"
-pre5 -which
means it is
supposes the present participle-"signifier"
more present than the latter. But at the same time its presence is
absence. That absence in it is what is most prominently present, is
what constitutes the fascination with and the mystery of the language of art.
This reference to what is not in the text-which
is a way of
being of the text-becomes explicit in texts that, being artistic and
critical at the same time, constitute, also, a certain way for the text
to exist as an anti-text. Major works of art possess this ability to
refer in an indeterminate way to what they are not. In this sense
they are capable of generating a tradition of betrayals, and of letting
themselves be usurped by other works (necessarily critical, in a
more or less intentional manner) that attempt to finish the impossible task. What these works are not, and so significantly say by
saying they arenot, is what the word covers up with its own shadow,
the dark side of representation, their Narcissus.

1. On this issue, see the proceedings from La psychanalyseest-elle une histoire
juive? Colloquede Montpellier, 1980 (Paris: Seuil, 1981).
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2. Harold Bloom, La Kabba/ae Ia tradizionecritica, Italian trans. by Mario
Diacono (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1981).
3. David Bakan, Sigmund Freudand the JewishMystical Tradition, 1958; Italian
trans.: Freud e la tradizionemistica ebraica(Milan: Edizioni di Comunita, 1977).
4. "It's a poor trick that consists in ramming a set of words down your gullet
on the principle that you can't bring them up without being branded as belonging
to their breed. But I'll fix their gibberish for them." Olympia Press edition of the
trilogy (Paris, 1959), p 451; Italian trans., L'innominabile(Milan: Mondadori, 1970),
p 46.
5. [Actually it should be "signifying," as in the corresponding forms in
French and Italian. Tr.]

